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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
14636 
RICKY JOE ARCHULETTA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Ricky Joe Archuletta, was convicted on 
June 10, 1976, in the Second Judicial District Court, in 
and for Davis County, of the offense of Burglary, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953), as amended 
(R.51). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On February 18, 1976, appellant was charged by 
way of complaint with the violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-202 (1953), as amended; burglary (R.4). Following 
a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of the above 
named offense in the Second Judicial District Court, in 
and for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
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Thornley K. Swan, presiding (R.51). On June 15, 1976, 
appellant was sentenced to a term in the Utah State 
Prison of not less than one year and no more than 
fifteen years (R.55). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the decision 
of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Feburary 8, 1976, Johnny and Judy Delgado's home 
in Clearfield, Utah, was burglarized. (T.4,12). Mrs. 
Delgado called the police to report the burglary. When 
the police arrived, it was determined that a television, 
stereo system and rifle had been stolen (T.4,12,28,33). 
Upon further inspection, it was discovered that a bedroom 
window had been broken (T.4,12). A hairbrush was found 
among the broken glass on the bedroom floor (T.7,48). 
The hairbrush was identified by Johnny Delgado as belonging 
to appellant Archuletta (T.17). 
At trial, Judy Delgado testified that her husband 
and the appellant were cousins and shared a close relation-
ship (T.16). She further stated that the appellant had 
been in their home earlier on the day of the burglary 
(February 8, 1976), and that her husband had shown the 
-2-
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appellant his new rifle (T.5,6). 
Officers Neumeyer and DeRyke testified that 
Mr. Delgado was very upset by the burglary and that he 
stated that he suspected that the appellant and Ralph Gomez 
had committed the burglary (T.29,34). Before the appellant 
was arrested, Mr. Delgado, through his contacts in the 
Spanish-American community, provided the police with 
valuable information as to the location of the stolen 
property (T.34). 
Angelo Caburo and Josie Flores,testifying on 
behalf of the defense, stated that on the morning of 
February 17, 1976, in the company of the appellant, they 
purchased a case of beer and went to the Flores' home to 
drink (T.58,65). In the early afternoon, after consuming 
much of the beer, the appellant asked Caburo to take him 
to the police station, which he and Flores proceeded to do 
(T.58,65). Both Flores and Caburo testified that, when they 
arrived at the police station, the appellant was drunk 
(T.59,65). 
Officer Bud DeRyke testified that he contacted 
appellant's mother and requested that the appellant meet 
with him on February 17, 1976, at his office in the Clear-
field Police Station (T.36). When Archuletta arrived on 
that day, he met with DeRyke, Officer Chadbourne and Randy 
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Hunter, secretary (T.37). DeRyke testified that he and 
Officer Chadbourne first gave appellant a Miranda 
warning by reading those rights to him several times. 
After each of the five statements in the Miranda warning, 
the appellant was asked if he understood the substance 
of the statement, to which he responded affirmatively 
(T. 71). 
The police then read to appellant a waiver of 
rights form because he informed the officers that he 
could not read (T.32,71). After each statement was 
read to appellant, he was asked if he understood the 
substance of his rights contained in the statement, to 
which he responded affirmatively (T.71,72). Appellant 
then signed the form (T.37,71). DeRyke testified that 
the appellant stated "at least three times that he 
understood his rights (T.37, lines 15,16). 
DeRyke further testified that he informed 
Archuletta that an interpreter would be made available 
if he desired, but the appellant responded that "he 
could understand English good enough (T.38, line 1). 
Officer Chadbourne then proceeded to question 
the appellant about the Delgado burglary. Miss Hunter 
recorded the interview in shorthand (T.73). At the 
conclusion of the interview, Miss Hunter read each 
-4-
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question and answer back to the appellant and he acknowledged 
that the answer he had given was correct in each case (T.73). 
The dictation was then typed by Miss Hunter and returned to 
Officer Chadbourne. With the typed statement in hand, Officer 
Chadbourne stood alongside the appellant and read each 
question and answer to him. The questions and answers were 
read "very slowly, very deliberately", and in each case, the 
appellant acknowledged that the answer read was correct (T.73, 
74). The appellant then signed the document (T.74). 
Officer DeRyke testified that the appellant exhibited 
no "difficulty in understanding the questions or any of the 
instructions given to him." (T.74, lines 20-22). 
In his statement given to Officers Chadbourne and 
DeRyke, Archuletta admitted breaking into the Delgado residence 
through the bedroom window, and, in the company of Ralph Gomez, 
stealing a television, stereo system and rifle (T.75). The 
rifle was taken to Gomez's home and the television to a 
girl's home in Ogden. Archuletta then stated that he would 
assist the officers in recovering the television, which he 
later did (T.76,77). Finally, the appellant stated that the 
last time he had seen his hairbrush was directly before the 
Delgado burglary (T.77). 
Officers Chadbourne and DeRyke, who interviewed appellant 
-s-
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shortly after his arrival at the police station, both 
testified that appellant was not drunk, that he walked 
steadily and that there was no odor of alcohol about 
him (T.70,71,105). Additional testimony was received 
from Officer Glen Parker and Miss Hunter to the effect 
that the appellant was not drunk, but appeared composed, 
very calm and without any signs of disorientation 
(T.84,110). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WHEN HE WAS INCARCERATED IN EXCESS OF 
THIRTY DAYS FOLLOWING HIS DEMAND FOR AN EARLIER TRIAL 
DATE. 
Appellant contends that any criminal defendant who 
is held or incarcerated for more than thirty days following 
both arraignment and a demand for an earlier trial date, 
as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-8(6) (1953), cannot 
then be tried. Respondent asserts that the delay in the 
instant case did not deny appellant his constitutional right 
to a speedy trial. 
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by 
-6-
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by Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah. 
Article 1, Section 12, provides: 
"In criminal prosecution, the 
accused shall have the right to • • • 
a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the County or District in 
which the offense is alleged to have 
been committed •••• " 
The Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 12, 
guarantees of a speedy trial are important safeguards 
in the prevention of undue and oppressive incarceration 
prior to trial, in the minimization of anxiety and 
concern accompanying public accusation and in the 
limitation of the possibilities that long delay will 
impair the ability of an accused to defend himself. 
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). 
The Utah Legislature has provided a statutory 
implementation of the constitutional guarantee to a 
speedy trial in Utah Code Ann.§ 77-1-8 (1953): 
"In criminal prosecutions, the 
defendant is entitled: (6) to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the county in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed: and 
every defendant in a criminal action 
unable to get bail shall be entitled 
to a trial within thirty (30) days after 
arraignment, if the court is then in session 
in such county, otherwise, the trial of 
such defendant shall be called on the 
next day of the next succeeding session 
of the court." 
-7-
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Appellant argues that the thirty day requirement 
of Section 77-1-8(6) must be interpreted strictly and 
that a criminal defendant is entitled to dismissal if 
it is exceeded. Respondent disagrees and asserts that 
Section 77-1-8 is directory and not mandatory. State v. 
Rasmussen, 18 Utah 2d 201, 418 P.2d 134 (1966); State v. 
Lozano, 23 Utah 2d 312, 462 P.2d 710 (1969). The criminal 
justice system is designed to proceed at a calculated 
speed, not only to insure that an accused's ability to 
defend himself-is not damaged by unnecessary incarcera-
tion and delay, but also to guarantee sufficient time 
for defense investigation and trial preparation. In 
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. at 120, the United States 
Supreme Court stated: 
" in large measure because 
of the many procedural safeguards provided 
an accused, the ordinary procedures for 
criminal prosecution are designed to 
move at a deliberate pace. A requirement 
of unreasonable speed would have a 
deleterious effect both upon the rights 
of the accused and upon the ability of 
society to protect itself. Therefore, 
this Court has consistently been of the 
view that 'The right of a speedy trial is 
necessarily relative. It is consistent with 
delays and depends upon circumstances. 
It secures rights to a defendant. It does 
not preclude the rights of public justice.' 
Beavers v. Haubert, 198 u.s. 77, 87, /.5 
S.Ct. 573, 576, 49 L.Ed. 950. 'Whether 
delay in completing a prosecution * * * 
-8-
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amounts to an unconstitutional 
deprivation of rights depends upon the 
circumstances. * * * The delay must not 
be purposeful or oppressive.' Pollard v. 
United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361, 77 S.Ct. 
481, 486, 1 L.Ed.2d 393. '[T]he essential 
ingredient is orderly expedition and 
not mere speed.' Smith v. United States, 
360 u.s. 1, lo, 79 s.ct. 991, 997, 
3 L.Ed.2d 1041." 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the perspective 
of Ewell when applying Section 77-1-8. In State v. Rasmussen, 
~' the Court held that Section 77-1-8(6) was directory,not 
mandatory and that "each case must be examined in light of its 
own particular facts." In Rasmussen, the defendant was arrested 
on April 3, 1965, and charged on April 5, 1965, followed by a 
preliminary hearing on May 14, 1965, being arraigned on June 2, 
1965. A trial date was set for June 15, 1965, but later post-
paned because the trial court had a homicide case in process. 
On that day, defendant made an oral motion for dismissal for 
lack of a speedy trial, which was denied. A second date was 
set for July 2, 1965, and was postponed because of the trial 
judge's illness and hospitalization. Another trial date was 
set for July 21, 1965, which also had to be postponed. The 
trial took place on July 27, 1965, about 45 days after the 
request for a speedy trail and motion to dismiss for want 
thereof. The court held that under these circumstances "no 
one was intentionally prejudiced by the two-week delay," and 
-9-
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therefore, defendant was not denied his right to a speedy 
trial. State v. Rasmussen, 418 P.2d at 135. 
In State v. Lozano, supra, cited by appellant, this 
Court dismissed a case for lack of a speedy trial where 
the defendant was held in jail for 135 days after a demand 
for a speedy trial, the trial date having been continued 
upon motion of the prosecution over the objections of 
the defendant. 
In the instant case, appellant was arraigned on 
March 30, 1976, and trial was set for April 30, 1976 (R.10, 
11). When it was discovered that April 30 was a legal 
holiday (Arbor Day),,the matter was stricken from the trial 
calendar. Appellant's attorney filed a demand for a speedy 
trial on May 3 (R.14). The Court then offered a new trial 
date to appellant's counsel of June 3 (within the thirty 
day period of Section 77-1-8), but appellant's counsel was 
unavailable on that date (R.22), and the matter was then 
set for trial on June 9 (R.15), 38 days after appellant's 
demand for a speedy trial. 
The delay in trial was not caused by the prosecution. 
Respondent asserts that there was no prejudicial delay in 
appellant's trial and, therefore, the trial court properly 
denied appellant's motion for dismissal based upon lack of a 
speedy trial. 
-Hl-
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POINT II 
APPELLANT'S CONFESSION WAS VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY 
GIVEN AND PROPERLY RECEIVED AT TRIAL. 
Appellant contends that his statement to the 
Clearfield Police concerning his participation in the 
Delgado burglary should have been suppressed at trial 
because he does not read or write.the English language and 
was intoxicated at the time the statement was given. 
Respondent notes that this Court has consistently 
held that on appeal from a judgment of conviction, it will 
view the testimony as a whole in the light most favorable 
to the state. State v. Jones, Utah, 554 P.2d 1321 (1976); 
State v. Howard, Utah, 544 P.2d 466 (1975); State v. Wilcox, 
28 Utah 2d 71, 498 P.2d 357 (1972). 
Testimony received at trial clearly shows that 
appellant's confession was made knowingly and voluntarily. 
Both Officers DeRyke and Chadbourne read appellant the 
Miranda warning and were assured by appellant that he 
understood his rights (T.37,71). The waiver of rights 
form was read to appellant several times and he stated 
that he understood the content of the form before he 
signed it (T.37,71,72). Finally, appellant's statement 
as to his participation in the Delgado burglary was transcribed 
and then repeated back to him to check its accuracy. After 
the statement was typed, it was read to appellant for a second 
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time and he again acknowledged that it was correct (T.73, 
74). The police officers also testified that Archuletta 
had no difficulty understanding their questions and 
responding to them (T.74). 
A confession is voluntary when it is the product 
of rational intellect and free will. Blackburn v. Alabama, 
361 U.S. 199 (1960); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 
(1966). The above cited testimony reveals that appellant's 
confession was made freely and without coercion. Appellant 
understood his rights, waived them and voluntarily provided 
the police with information regarding the Delgado burglary. 
Appellant's statement reveals that he broke into the Delgado 
home and took from it a television, stereo system and rifle 
(T.75,76). The confession also states that Archuletta did 
not believe that he had the Delgado's permission to take the 
property (T.76). 
Appellant's counsel asserts that because appellant 
Archuletta does not read or write the English language, his 
statement could not have been made voluntarily and 
knowingly. Appellant cites no case law supporting this 
contention. Decisional law indicates that the inability to 
read or write the English language does not render a 
confession involuntary and inadmissible. People v. Dacy, 
85 Cal.Rptr. 57, 5 C.A.3d 216 (1970); State v. Ortiz, 422 
-12-
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P.2d 355, 77 N.M. 316 (1967); State v. Brady, 469 P.2d 77, 
105 Ariz. 592 (1970). 
Appellant further contends that he was drunk at 
the time he made his statement to the police and that, 
therefore, his statement is inadmissible. Officers 
DeRyke, Chadbourne and Parker and Miss Hunter all 
testified that appellant was not drunk, did not smell 
of alcohol, walked steadily and was not disoriented 
during his visit to the police station on February 17, 
1976 (T.70,71,84,105,110). Several cases have held that 
the fact an individual has been drinking, even to the extent 
that he is under the influence of intoxicants, does not 
necessarily mean that he cannot understand advice and 
cannot be bound by his subsequent conduct in deciding to 
waive the right of which he is advised. State v. Smith, 
476 P.2d 802, 4 Or. App. 130 (1970); Tucker v. State, 
Nevada, 553 P.2d 951 (1976); State v. Clark, 110 Ariz. 
242, 517 P.2d 1238 (1974); In re Cameron, 439 P.2d 633, 
68 C.2d 487, 67 Cal.Rptr. 529 (1968). However, if by 
reason of extreme intoxication a confession cannot be 
said to be the product of a rational intellect and free 
will, it is not admissible. State v. Smith, supra; In re 
Cameron, supra. In the instant case, appellant has failed 
-13-
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to show that he was intoxicated to an extent sufficient to 
render his confession inadmissible. 
Finally, appellant cites State v. Rivera, 381 P.2d 
584, 94 Ariz. 45 (1963), contending that an interpreter should 
have been provided at the time of his confession. Rivera 
is distinguishable from the present case. In Rivera, the 
appellant did not read, speak or understand the English 
language. In the instant case, appellant spoke and under-
stood English. Appellant felt that an interpreter was not 
necessary, as he stated to Officer DeRyke (T.38). Further-
more, in the instant case, testimony was received by the 
trial court indicating that the appellant had no trouble 
understanding and participating in the interview (T.74). 
Viewing the testimony in a light most favorable 
to the decision of the lower court, it is clear that the 
appellant understood his rights and knowingly and voluntarily 
chose to waive them. 
POINT II 
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION, AN UNSOLICITED AND VOLUNTARY 
STATEMENT BY A WITNESS THAT THE APPELLANT HAD BEEN IN 
PRISON, WHERE SUCH STATEMENT WAS NOT HIGHLIGHTED OR 
EMPHASIZED, WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL AND NOT GROUNDS FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. 
-14-
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Appellant argues that a statement by his mother, 
during the course of cross-examination, was prejudicial 
and should form the basis for a new trial: 
"Q. I see now, Ricky is over 
30 years of age. Has he worked at 
all during this period of time? 
A. Yah. Not too much, because 
he was, he was in prison." (T.117, lines 
22-25). 
Appellant claims that this evidence had the effect 
of tainting his character and securing his conviction. 
Respondent concedes that Rule 47, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1953), prohibits adnission of evidence concerning 
a trait of an accused's character as tending to prove 
his guilt or innocence of the offense charged. The Rule 
also states that evidence of other crimes should not be 
brought in for the purpose of disgracing a defendant or 
showing a propensity to commit crimes. State v. Schieving, 
Utah, 535 P.2d 1232 (1975); State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 
495 P.2d 1265 (1972). Respondent asserts, however, that the 
above-quoted testimony did not violate the intent and 
purpose of Rule 47, and was not brought into evidence for 
the purpose of disgracing appellant or showing a propensity 
to commit crime. The testimony was proper and should be 
allowed for any of· the following reasons: 
1. Appellant failed to object to the introduction 
of the supposedly prejudicial evidence at the time it was 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
offered at trial. This Court has consistently ruled that an 
appellant cannot complain on appeal of the admissibility of 
testimony to which he failed to object at trial. Child v. 
Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 (1958); Christensen v. 
Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951). 
Appellant argues that no objection was made at 
trial because it would only have dramatized the testimony 
in the minds of the jury and that even if he had objected, 
the only remedy available to the court was an instruction striki. 
the testimony from the record and from the minds of the jury. 
Appellant contends that such an instruction is of questionable 
value and utility. Yet this Court has stated that when improper I 
I 
testimony is produced, an instruction by the judge explaining 
the improriety of the testimony and urging the jury not to 
"indulge any bias or prejudice" against the defendant because 
of the testimony is sufficient to prevent prejudice and 
injustice. State v. Mason, Utah, 530 P.2d 795, 798 (1975). 
2. The testimony of appellant's mother was competent, 
relevant and served a legitimate purpose. In State v. Mason, 
supra, this Court held:: 
" • if there is some legitimate 
purpose to be served by evidence which is 
otherwise competent and relevant, the 
fact that it may also show the admission 
of another crime will not render it 
inadmissible." Id. at 797. 
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Appellant's mother had been questioned by the prosecutor 
about appellant's home life, education and work experience. 
Such testimony was relevant to help establish those 
experiential factors which would provide the jury 
with information as to appellant's language skills; a 
matter at issue at trial. The fact that the appellant 
had been in prison would tend to show that he had had 
experiences which would help develop his English language 
skills beyond those of his Spanish speaking home and 
community. 
3. The challenged testimony was not directly 
solicited nor thereafter emphasized by the prosecution. 
The prosecutor did not ask the witness any direct 
questions about the appellant's prior criminal involvement 
or prison experience. The prosecution was pursuing a 
relevant line of questioning regarding appellant's 
background as a means of elucidatinq.his language skills. 
The challenged testimony was unsolicited and only 
indirectly responsive to the prosecutor's question. The 
prosecutor in the instant matter did not question the 
witness about prior criminal involvement, as did 
prosecutors in prior cases where this Court has held such 
testimony to be inadmissible. State v. Peterson, 23 
Utah 2d 58, 457 P.2d 532 (1969); State v. Dickson, 12 
Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961). Furthermore, the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
challenged testimony was not emphasized nor highlighted 
in any way. The transcript of the trial proceedings 
reveals that the prosecutor personally made no mention 
of the appellant's previous prison term and did not seek 
to encourage or request the witness to elaborate fu~ther. 
Instead, the prosecutor questioned the witness more 
specifically about the appellant's past work experience 
(T.117, lines 22-30). Thus, it is evident that the 
questioned testimony was not highlighted nor reiterated and 
that the prosecution made no attempt to misuse the testimony 
of appellant's mother. 
In this context, respondent submits that 
Pricilla Flores' testimony was harmless and not prejudicial 
to appellant. State v. Kazda, Utah, 545 P.2d 190 (1976). 
4. Prior testimony had already revealed that 
appellant had served a prison term. On re-direct examina-
tion, appellant's own witness announced that appellant had 
previously been in prison: 
"BY MR. BARNES: 
Q. Do you have any knowledge 
concerning your brother's ability to 
read and write. 
A. He don't know how to read 
or write. 
Q. How do, lyou know? 
A. Because I have wrote him some 
letters for his friends up when he got 
out of prison." (T. 68, lines 4-10) • 
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Where appellant's own witness previously announced 
that appellant has been in prison, testimony received 
on subsequent cross-examination about appellant's prison 
term cannot be deemed prejudicial to an extent sufficient 
to establish grounds for a new trial. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, 
INCLUDED WITHIN AND MADE A PART OF HIS APPELLATE BRIEF, IS 
UNTIMELY AND IMPROPERLY BROUGHT AND THE ARGUMENTS RAISED 
THEREIN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT AS PART OF 
APPELLANT'S APPELLATE BRIEF. 
In Point IV of appellant's brief to this Court, he 
petitions the Court for habeas corpus relief (page 13). 
Said relief is requested for two reasons: (1) the trial 
court did not have jurisdiction because it failed to bring 
appellant to trial within 30 days of his request for an 
earlier trial date, and (2) because appellant's impecuniosity 
prevented him from obtaining a transcript for 15 months, 
he was denied equal protection of the law. 
Respondent asserts that appellant's petition for 
habeas corpus relief is unt.mely and improper for either 
of the following two reasons and that the points raised 
therein should be reviewed as part of this Court's 
consideration of appellant's appeal. 
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1. The judgment in this case was signed by the 
trial judge June 16, 1976 (R.61), and the motion for a 
new trial was filed timely, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4 (1953), 
on June 18, 1976 (R.59), but was never called up for 
disposition. Thereafter, some 17 months later, appellant 
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-5 (1953), provides that an 
appeal may be taken within one month after notice of the 
denial of a motion for a new trial. Since no ruling has 
ever been made on the motion for a new trial, said motion 
is still pending; the time for appeal has not expired and 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus is "moot." 
Jones v. Smith, Utah, 550 P.2d 194 (1976). 
In Jones v. Smith, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
"It appears to us that the time 
for appeal had not expired, since no 
ruling had been made on the motion for 
a new trial. Either party could have 
called the motion to the attention of 
the court and had a ruling made thereon." 
Id. at 195. 
2. After an accused has been convicted of a crime, 
any claimed error or defect is required to be corrected by 
appeal within the time provided by law. Andreason v. Turner, 
27 Utah 2d 182, 493 P.2d 1278 (1972). This Court has 
consistently held that matters properly heard on appeal 
cannot be used as a basis for granting a writ of habeas 
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corpus. Jones v. Smith, supra; Ainslie v. Smith, Utah, 
531 P.2d 864 (1975); Schad v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 345, 
496 P.2d 263 (1972); Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 
431 P.2d 121 (1967). The matters presented in the 
application for a writ of habeas corpus are all proper 
for consideration on appeal, and should be presented and 
resolved with this appeal. 
A. APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WHEN HE WAS 
INCARCERATED IN EXCESS OF THIRTY DAYS 
FOLLOWING HIS DEMAND FOR AN EARLIER TRIAL 
DATE. 
In subpart 1 of Point IV of appellant's brief 
(page 14), appellant raises the identical issue argued in 
Point I of his brief (page 6), alleging additionally only 
that such argument is proper in an application for a writ 
of habeas corpus. Respondent has previously shown that 
habeas corpus relief is not proper at this stage of 
these proceedings. Respondent submits, therefore, that 
appellant was properly tried and convicted ;and was not 
prejudiced because trial was not had within thirty days 
of his motion for an earlier trial date, as argued in 
Point I of this brief (see Point I, page 6). 
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B. APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A 'I'HANSCRIPT OF 
TRIAL IN PREPARATIOH FOR APPEAL, BECAUSE 
OF HIS IMPECUNIOSITY, IN VIOLATION OF 
HIS RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW. 
Appellant contends that he suffered as a result 
of his inability to pay for a transcript of trial. 
Respondent asserts that appellant was provided with a 
transcript of trial in preparation for appeal and that 
the delay in obtaining a transcript was not prejudicial. 
On June 16, 1976, appellant was sentenced to 
not less than one year and not more than fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison (R.61). On June 17, 1976, 
counsel for appellant filed a notice of appeal (R.57), 
and notice of withdrawal (R.58), with accompanying 
motion (R.57). 
On July 7, 1976, Archuletta filed a notice of 
appeal, prose (R.63). 
On March 3, 1977, designation of record on appeal 
and appellant's affidavit of impecuniosity were filed 
(R.67,71). However, because of the failure to prosecute 
this appeal, the time prescribed by Rule 75, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure (1953), for filing designation of record 
on appeal had expired necessitating appellant's motion for 
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extension of time for filing designation of record on 
appeal, dated March 3, 1977 (R.77). The Second Judicial 
District Court granted appellant's motion for extension 
of time on March 15, 1977, and filed its order July 21, 
1977 (R. 73). 
It is obvious that a transcript of trial could not 
be prepared until the court granted appellant's motion for 
an extension because of the time requirements of Rule 75. 
Once the court granted appellant's motion he was free to 
request a transcript, which he did on August 5, 1977 (R.75). 
The transcript was provided on September 27, 1977 (R.77). 
Respondent asserts that the delay in obtaining 
a transcript was the result of the delay in proceeding with 
the appeal both by appellant and his attorney and not the 
result of appellant's impecuniosity. Respondent further 
asserts that a transcript was provided appellant and was 
done in a timely manner following the belated designation 
of transcript (R.75). 
Appellant cites Roberts v. Lavallee, 389 U.S. 40 
(1967), in support of his contention of sufficiency and 
prejudice. Respondent notes that Roberts is readily 
distinguished from the case at bar. Roberts was denied 
a free transcript of a preliminary hearing. In the 
present matter, Archuletta was never denied a transcript, 
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but was provided one upon a final, proper request. The 
prejudice suffered by Roberts in preparation for trial 
due to the lack of the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing, does not exist in the instant case because 
appellant has had access to the trial transcript in 
preparation of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent avers that appellant was not denied his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial when he was 
incarcerated in excess of thirty days following his demand 
for an ealier trial date. Furthermore, appellant's 
confession was voluntarily and knowingly given and properly 
received at trial. During trial, an unsolicited and 
voluntary statement, made by a witness on cross-examination, 
that the appellant had been in prison, where such statement 
was not highlighted nor emphasized, was not prejudicial 
and not grounds for a new trial. 
Finally, appellant's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, included within and made a part of his appellate 
brief, is untimely and improperly brought and the arguments 
raised therein should be considered by this Court as part 
of appellant's appellate brief. 
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Based upon the above cited authority and 
argument, respondent prays that this Court affirm the 
decision of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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